

Topics

- How can we safely store passwords?
- How do we verify a document is authentic?
- How can we trust websites?

Storing Passwords

Storing Passwords

Password verification systems don't store plain text passwords

— <u>.</u>,

- Adds security: attacker getting a copy of the password file gives them the hash which cannot be used to log in.
- To check a password, system checks

Linux stores passwords in /etc/shadow (accessible by root)



Rainbow Table Attack

Rainbow table attack

- ..

- Can then quickly search password file of hashes for known passwords.
- Defence: Salt the password.
 - Salt: ...
 - Store salt and hash(user-password || salt)(|| means concatenation)
 - Verify password:

..

 Attacker cannot reasonably compute hash of all possible passwords along with all possible salts.

Verifying Documents

Secure digest

- Secure digest for summary of document
 - Often used to verify a downloaded file is not corrupted.
 - A secure digest is a summary of a message:

...

- Typically produced by a cryptographic hash function e.g., SHA-256.
- Example

\$ sha256sum ./README.md

e293cdc4f5c4686772fba8159be9e9636654fed7ce72bfd2e75add8a6833c5ab ./README.md

Digital Signature

- Digital signatures combine public key crypto and hashing.
 - Goal: ..
 - The message can be public;
 we just want to prove who sent it and that it's unaltered.
- Two parties: signer and verifier.
 - The Signer:
 - Sends a message
 - Wants to prove they sent the message.
 - The Verifier:
 - Receives message
 - Wants to verify the message was sent by the signer and is unaltered.

Signer

- The Signer will:
 - Writes a document: m
 - Computes a message digest: h(m) (e.g., using SHA-256)
 - Not good enough yet: Adversary could write document z, computes h(z) and plant both on the server.
 - ..(e.g., using RSA public key crypto)
 - This is called signing.
 - Only the signer has the private key, so only the signer can encode with it.
 - Sends the message & the signature: <m, enc(h(m))>

Verifier

- The Verifier will:
 - Receives the message and the signature: <m, enc(h(m))>
 - Decrypts the signature with..
 dec(enc(h(m))) == h(m)
 - Computes a message digest: h(m). Let's call it h'.
 - ..
- If yes, then the message is authentic.
- Since only signer knows their private key,
 ...
 then they must have signed the document.

Trusting Unknown Companies

Digital Certificate

- Digital certificates use digital signatures.
- Scenario
 - Imagine sending password to website (e.g., Instagram).
 - You encrypt your password with Instagram's public key.
 - Only Instagram can decrypt the message, so password is safe.
- Questions
 - ..
 - One way: Instagram sends you their public key when you first go site.
 - How do you know if the public key really belongs to Instagram?
 But a rogue website could disguise as Instagram and send you a wrong key.

Secure Browsing

- HTTP has no encryption.
- HTTPS uses encryption:
 - Instagram sends you its public key in a digital certificate.
 - Digital Certificate:

..

- Your OS verifies the authenticity of the digital certificate.
 OS has some built-in..
- Your browser then uses Instagram's public key to encrypt messages to Instagram.
- Only Instagram can decrypt messages encrypted with their public key.

Digital Cert Operation


- How digital certificates work:
 - A digital certificate is signed by a digital certificate authority
 - E.g., VeriSign, DigiCert
 - OS vendor ships OS with public keys for some trusted digital certificate authorities like DigiCert.
 - This establishes the base level of trust:

- -

Digital Certificate Example

- Instagram uses DigiCert:
 - Instagram goes to DigiCert, gives its public key, and requests a digital certificate.
- DigiCert creates a digital certificate:
 - It says "this public key belongs to Instagram"

- ..



Digital Certificate Example (cont)

- Instagram Digital Certificate
 - When browser connects to Instagram,
 Instagram sends the digital certificate.
 - Browser uses its trusted public key for DigiCert to verify the digital certificate from Instagram.
 - If your OS is not compromised, this whole process is secure based on the first level of trust.
 - If the OS is compromised, there is no 1st level of trust and this whole process is not secure.
- Encryption Use
 - ..(public key is slow and generates lots of data)
 - Rest of communication..(faster, smaller)

Chain of Trust

- Digital certificates rely on the chain of trust
 - To trust the public key sent by Instagram, we need to trust DigiCert's signature.
 - To trust DigiCert's signature,
 we need to trust DigiCert's public key.
 - In order to trust DigiCert's public key (shipped with OS),
 we need to trust that our OS is not compromised.
- Chain of trust relies on the root of trust being trustworthy.

Our root of trust is the OS.

Activity: SSH

- [Opt] Spin up new container: docker run -it ghcr.io/sfu-cmpt-201/base
- Generate public/private key with ed25519 & passphrase \$ ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "your email address"
 - Look at files in ~./ssh
- SSH SFU
 - ssh <yourlD>@csil-cpu01.csil.sfu.ca -p24
 Asks user name & password; use VPN if off campus.
- SSH Keys
 - SSH SFU; manually add pub key to end of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 - Log-out, log-in (asks passphrase)
- SSH Agent: Avoids passphrase; Stores key in memory. eval ssh-agent ssh-add kill \$SSH_AGENT_PID

Hash Collisions

Birthday Match = Hash Collision

Birthday Match

 In a class of 30 people, probability of two students having the same birthday is.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack

Hash Collisions

Given enough messages,

. .

i.e., can we show that a hash function

- (Recall) Strong collision resistance:
 It should be difficult to find two messages x and x' where h(x) == h(x').
 - i.e., given a hash function, it should be difficult to find two values that produce the same hash.

Birthday Attack

- Attacker use a contract the customer is expected to sign (say agreement to buy company for \$100,000).
- Attacker then:
 - .. (adding a space, adding commas, adding typos, ...)
 - Creates malicious altered copies (sale price \$100,000,000)
 - Goal: ..
 - Customer given benign copy to sign using their private key and hash of document.
 - Attacker then...
 - Since the contracts have same hash, attacker can claim customer signed malicious contract using their private key!

Demo: Hash Collision

- Demo: Collision in Crypto Hash Functions
 - MD5 was a widely used crypto hash function but was found to be insecure by 2005.
 - No longer in use.
- Get images & Compare Hashes
 - \$ wget https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/md5collisions/ship.jpg
 - \$ wget https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/md5collisions/plane.jpg
 - \$ openssl dgst -md5 ship.jpg
 - \$ openssI dgst -md5 plane.jpg
 - Algorithm exists to manipulate a pair of images into having the same MD5 hash.
- SHA255 is not yet known to be insecure.
 - \$ openssl dgst -sha256 ship.jpg
 - \$ openssl dgst -sha256 plane.jpg

ABCD: Birthday

- A birthday attack is successful when attackers find:
 - a) Two images that look the same but have different binary data.
 - b) Two students in CMPT 201 who have the same birthday.
 - c) A second document which matches the hash of a single given document.
 - d) Hash collision of a benign and malicious document.

Analysis

- c) is Weak collision resistance
- d) is somewhat strong collision resistance; it is the target of a Birthday Attack

Summary

- Passwords
 - Store salted and hashed passwords to avoid rainbow tables.
- Digest
 - A hash of a document.
- Digital Signatures
 - Sign a hash with a private key.
- Digital Certificates
 - Sign document to show who really owns a public/private key.
 - Chain of trust for distributing certificates.
 - Root of trust built into OS.
- Hash Collisions
 - Duplicate hash (digital signature) is a security issue.
 - Birthday attack to find duplicates.

25-11-18 24